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The Least Dangerous Branch: The Dark Horse in American Democracy
Abstract
This research examines the extent to which the Supreme Court has the power to influence public opinion.
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the Supreme
Court. However, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to turn the casual arrow from the
Court to the public underscores the fact that the question of whether or not a dynamic, back-and-forth
relationship exists is still open for debate. Using a portion of the work done by Erikson, MacKuen and
Stimson in The Macro Polity (2002) as a model, and relying heavily on James Stimson's public mood data and
salient Supreme Court decisions from 1969-2008, this study asserts that the Supreme Court has the power to
influence the public mood on salient issues, especially with regard to highly unanimous decisions.
Consequently, this study suggests a dialogue exists between two groups that were never intended to speak.
This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol19/iss1/9
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THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE DARK HORSE IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 
Lexi Baltes 
Abstract: Tbis research examilles the extent to Ivhich the Supreme Court bas the pOlver to influence public opinion. 
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the Supreme Cotll1. 
HOIVever, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to tum the casual armv jivm the Court to the 
public tlJJdersc01�s the fact that tbe question oftvhether or 1I0t a t/ynamic, back-andforth relationship exists is still open 
for debate. Usitl!! a p011ion of the Ivork done by Erikson, MacKtlCn and Stimson itt The Macro Polity (2002) as a 
mode� and relyill!! heavily on James Stimson's public mood data and salient Supreme COtilt decisions fronl 1969-
2008, this stllt/y asserts that the Supreme COUlt has the pOIVer to influence the public mood on salient ismes, especially 
Ivith regard to highly unanimous decisions. Consequently, this stut/y suggests a dialogue exists behveen hvo grotrps that 
}vere never intended to speak. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion carries great weight in the American form of democratic government. A 
government by the people and for the people implies the certainty of a back-and-fortb dialogue 
between public preferences and institutional accommodations. In order to ensure the government 
acts faithfully, certain restraints are in place-namely, electoral accountability and legitimacy through 
acceptance. In this way, the public controls the thermostat, choosing the ideological temperature of 
the policy produced, enforced, and allowed to stand.10' 
The public has tremendous power and influence over the governing of the nation, yet it is 
well documented that, at least at the individual level, the public is not well informed about political 
issues.'03 But how, and how effectively, is the public calling the shots for a global superpower? John 
Zaller (1992) and James Stimson (1991; 1994) explain that by relying on elite influence (politicians, 
public officials, etc.) and other heuristics, the public manages to make rational decisions and control 
the ideological thermostat in a systematic and predictable way. Public opinion is tied to governmental 
action and positions. However,Jacobs and Shapiro are adamant about the diminishing 
responsiveness to public opinion. They believe that politicians use the measurement of public 
opinion "not to move their positions closer to the public's (as commonly assumed) but just the 
opposite-to find the most effective means to move public opinion closer to their own desired 
policies."104 
This is a dangerous proposition for any branch of government, but what of the "least 
dangerous branch," the branch theoretically isolated from the passions of the public and the passing 
partisan tides? The interaction between the Supreme Court and public opinion may be both the most 
interesting and least studied relationship for largely the same reason: it is the forbidden fruit of 
government and politics, the relationship that was never supposed to be. However, in order to 
102 Erikson, MacKuen, S timson 2002; Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953; Wlezien 1995 
103 e.g. Converse 1962 
104 J acobs & S hapiro 2002, p. 5 5  
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understand politics today, the question must be asked: to what extent do Supreme Court decisions 
have the power to influence public opinion and mood? There is a significant compilation of 
scholarship suggesting the presence of the relationship between public opinion and its influence on 
Supreme Court decisions, but not much more than defensive, nervous rhetoric regarding the reversal 
of the causal arrow. This research, relying heavily on Stimson's public mood data and salient 
Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 2008, seeks to shed light on the extent to which the 
"least dangerous branch" can influence the public at a level as fundamental as mood and opinion, 
and investigate the implications the results have on the balance of power. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over 50 years ago, Robert Dahl sparked interest in the Supreme Court's political presence. 
He wrote, "As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not 
quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it," and 
yet, "much of the legitimacy of the Court's decisions rest upon the fiction that it is not a political 
institution but exclusively a legal one," (1957). The idea that the nation has turned a blind eye to the 
incongruous attributes it associates with the Court only becomes clearer as partisan divide places 
increasing credence on ideological position of issues and policy. 
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion 
on the Supreme Court.105 Theory would suggest, in these more polarized times, this influence would 
weaken or fade completely as Justices become more fixated upon an ideological stance regardless of 
external influences. Nevertheless, in a relatively recent study of cases from 1953-1996, McGuire and 
Stimson (2004) found that the Supreme Court continues to weigh their decisions against public 
mood so as to issue decisions that have a chance of being enforced. 
These findings are reminiscent of Dahl's influential propositions and an ample amount of 
legitimacy hypothesis scholarship since then.'OG Recent scholarship suggests that public mood, even 
after controlling for the "social forces" that influence both public and judicial mood, influences 
constitutional interpretations espoused in Supreme Court decisions.'07 At the very least, this points to 
the weighed and measured constraint placed on the Court based on its own forethought and self­
preservation. Like other politicians, Supreme Court Justices seem to have a perception of the most 
expedient position.IOB There is an established pattern of acknowledgement of, and respect for, public 
mood in the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
105 J\rIcGuire & Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns, Wohlfarth 2010; Erikson, Stimson, MacKeun 2002 
106 Mondak 1992; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; Marshall 1987; 
Johnson & Martin 1998 
107 Casillas, Enns, & Wohlfarth 2010 
108 Stimson, rvIacKuen & Erikson 1995 
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The presence of a unified voice from scholars regarding the existence of a relationship 
running from public mood to Supreme Court decisions cannot be overstated when theorizing about 
reverse causation. If the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions depend, at least in part, on public 
acceptance, then it follows that the Court would actively try to pull public opinion toward its 
preferences. The idea of figuratively purchasing stability public opinion finds wide support among 
scholars of the Supreme Court.I09 Referenced many ways throughout the literature, the term 
"judicial capital" will hereby be used to indicate the "funds" used by the Supreme Court. The theory 
maintains that the Court can use its judicial capital to purchase the legitimacy of a decision, but at 
some point it will run out of capital and have to start saving again. This research is less interested in 
determining the way in which the Court gains, spends, and otherwise uses this capital than it is with 
advancing the notion that when purchasing legitimacy, the Court might also be purchasing public 
opinion. The idea of judicial capital is a foundational theoretical justification that functions to situate 
and legitimize this study within the larger body of literature. 
Turning to the relatively small pool of research that looks at the influence of Supreme Court 
decision on public opinion, it becomes clear that the question of whether or not a dynamic, or 
biconditional, relationship between the Court and the public exists is still open for debate. Much of 
the current literature concludes evidence is lacking to indicate any such relationship exists.1l0 
However, there are flaws in both theory and design throughout this camp of research. 
In one of the more prominent studies, Marshall (1987) finds that but for a small collection of 
cases, Supreme Court decisions have virtually no effect on public opinion. He looks at the influence 
of just eighteen cases using pre- and post-decision opinion poll data. The statistical limitations of 
such a design go without saying, but what is more, the eighteen Court decisions used were from 
varying issue domains. It is important to note that when researching the impact of Supreme Court 
decisions it is difficult to justify looking at individual cases. It is well known that "(policy) is highly 
cumulative, the result of a stream of decisions over cime."lll, The Court rarely rules singularly or 
finally on any issue, and even when it does, its decision is still taken in concert with decisions on 
other issues. Therefore, it is flawed to look at certain isolated hiccups in the Court's discourse and 
far better to analyze its influence in light of the fluid voice espoused in a collection of decisions. 
Other studies stop shott of actually investigating the influence of the Supreme Court on public 
opinion because they conclude that people know too little to be able to systematically respond to 
J09 Casillas et. a1. 2010; McGuire & Stimson 2004; Hetherington & Smith 2007; Mondak 1992; Caldeira & 
Gibson 1992 
lID Blake 1977; Marshall 1987; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; 
Hetherington & S mith 2007 
1 1 1  Erikson ct. aL 2002 
4SlRES PUBLICA 
Supreme Court decisions.112 People generally lack political information and the motivation necessary 
to process and correctly align themselves with ideological positions taken in Court opinions.l13 
Therefore, these researchers conclude there is no reason to look further. This study is much less 
concerned with knowledge and explicit awareness of Court decisions, but instead asserts that 
awareness is not a requirement for potential influence. To believe otherwise is to discount ample 
research in the way of heuristics besides knowledge that have been confidently considered to aid the 
formation of "appropriate" public opinions, and ignore the reality that public mood may be an 
airborne \r1rUS catchable absent direct contact. 
Those finding a significant influence of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion 114 are 
relatively few in number and possess their own theoretical and logistical shortcomings. Mondak 
(1992) finds that the Court can increase support for rulings, but at a price. This is consistent with the 
judicial capital theory. However, it would seem that when measuring influence of the Court, analysis 
ought not be limited to support for the decision, but perhaps better focused on ensuing change of 
opinion, especially opinion on the issues about which the decision was determined. Furthermore, 
Mondak's conclusions are drawn from a controlled experiment that utilizes hypothetical policy and 
rulings, which exacerbates the limitations of the research. 
Taking a unique approach, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) also find that the Supreme Court 
influences public opinion. However, they do not measure influence in terms of increased support 
for the Court's position on an issue. Instead, they measure the structural change of groups 
supporting certain issue positions, finding that Supreme Court decisions lead to greater homogeneity 
and clearer preferences between groups (1989). Though Franklin and Kosaki view this structural 
change as the dichotomous alternative to increased support, in reality, it neither helps nor hinders the 
theory advanced in this research; rather, it merely answers a complementary question regarding the 
Court-public relationship. They also find that salient issues blunt the Court's impact because salient 
issues are those about which people already have well-ordered beliefs. This is significant because the 
study at hand looks only at salient issues and cases. Implications of evidence regarding Supreme 
Court influence on these issues would seem to suggest that the Court has some power to change 
minds, not to simply help form opinions. This study aims to complement Franklin and Kosaki's 
work so as to offer a broader picture of Supreme Court influence on the public and offer clearer 
implications about any such relationship. 
Johnson and Martin (1998) support the conclusions drawn by Franklin and Kosaki, but 
suggest even further limits on the Court's influence. They posit that the Court may influence the 
1 12 Murphy & Tanenhous 1968 
113 Hetherington & S mith 2007 
114 Petrick 1968, Franklin & Kosaki 1989, Mondak 1992, Johnson & Martin 1998 
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public in accord with the structural change hypothesis, but any kind of influence only occurs after the 
first major ruling on a given issue: subsequent rulings have no effect. Tracking single issues across 
time, the expectations for this study are fundamentally at odds with the limitations put forth by 
Johnson et. al. (1998). 
In sum, a theoretically sound and scientifically verifiable approach to analyzing Supreme Court 
influence on public opinion is lacking. The absence of a unified scholarly voice on the topic, and 
even on the approach to studying the topic, is not altogether surprising, considering the relatively few 
specific inqniries into the idea of Supreme Court influence on public opinion. Furthermore, there are 
limitations inherent in the study of an institution with the power to handpick the issues it addresses 
combined with the study of a free public whose preferences have only recenrly become well 
documented. This research attempts to go some way towards filling this gap and standardizing the 
approach through which future research on the topic might utilize, by implementing a new method 
that pairs external validity with formulaic consideration for accuracy and error. 
After determining that public opinion influences not only Supreme Court decisions but rather 
the outputs of all three branches of government, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, 2008) 
extend the thermostat analogy and turn the casual arrow around for Congressional policy-looking 
at public mood!15 as a function of policy and finding a negative relationship. As policy becomes more 
liberal the public mood becomes more conservative, or in other words, as policy moves in one 
ideological direction, the public has a logical increased desire for policy in the other direction. The 
Macro Polity model will be employed in this research to extend the analysis of mood as a function of 
policy into the realm of policy espoused in Supreme Court decisions. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
The central predication of this research is that Supreme Court decisions do, in fact, influence 
public opinion. However, this proposition is not intended to act counter to evidence suggesting that 
public opinion influences the Court; rather, it is a supplemental study aimed at uncovering a more 
complete picture of this relationship as a two way street. One side of the street is paved, the other 
currently in its primitive stages of construction. 
In order to test the dynamic part of this relationship, the part that points the casual arrow from 
Supreme Court decisions back to the public, I will use the portion of testing done in The Macro Polity 
that looks at mood as a function of policy (2002, 2008) as a model. In their study, Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson create an index by awarding a -1 (conservative) or + 1 (liberal) to each piece 
of significant (as defined in David Mayhew's two sweep test) legislation! 16, and then taking the 
cumulative sum of these scores to create one score for each biennium. Using this score as the key 
115 Stimson 2012 
116 May hew 1991 
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independent variable they run an Ordinary Least Squares regression to analyze the influence of policy 
on public mood (using Stlmson's public mood data) controlling for the effects of the economy on 
mood, specifically inflation and unemployment indicators. As previously mentioned, their testing 
ultimately concludes there is a negative relationship regarding policy influence on mood; thus, a 
representation of the thermostat analogy. 
Based on this model, I approach Supreme Court decisions in much the same way that Erikson 
et. al. approach policy. Looking at Court cases from 1969-2008,117 I consider only salient cases,1l8 and 
of those, only cases involving race, religion, or sex (discrimination, privacy, etc.) issues119, There are 
multiple defenses for this emphasis on salience. First, it is consistent with The Macro Polity model, 
which only looks at salient policy.'20 Second, it is most interesting to understand the public's 
relationship and interaction with the Court on issues that matter most to both groups. Finally, 
research has shown that the Court is most likely to defy public opinion on salient cases.'2' Therefore, 
in an attempt to look at the back and forth between the Court and the public, it is best to look at 
cases in which there is not complete harmony between the Court decision and public preference. The 
idea here is that, whether or not the public is aware or has any knowledge of the decisions, salient 
cases in these issue domains are the ones most likely to matter, which is different than influence; if it 
were otherwise, this study would be irrelevant. 
The restrictions mentioned above leave 146 cases for analysis, with an average of just under 
four cases per year. In accord with Erikson et. al., each decision was given one of five scores: -1, -0.5, 
0, 0.5, 1. Negative values indicate a conservative decision, positive values indicate a liberal decision, 
and zero indicates a decision that is neither liberal nor conservative.I22 A score of -0.5 or 0.5 was 
awarded when the decision was obviously narrow in scope or left open the clear possibility of a 
different decision given slightly different circumstances.'23 The sum of the scores in each year was 
produced to create a cumulative decision score per year. 
117 This is a post-Warren Court case pool. The Warren Court is often said to be the most activist Court of all 
time-here we look at the influence of supposedly less activist courts. This time period is also convenient, in 
that public mood data becomes much more reliable around the 1960s. 
118 Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a \.videly accepted operationalization of salient cases to be those appearing 
on the front page of the New Ym:k Tillles the day after the decision was released. 
11<) These three issue domains are broad enough to include a wide range of opinions, but they are also issues 
about which people are not only likely to have formed opinions but those with which they have personal 
experience. 
120 Erikson et. al. 2002 
121 Casillas et. aJ. 2011 
122 Only a handful of zeros were awarded, and all were cases in which the Court unanimously decided not to 
decide and remand for more information. 
123 In addition to a single primary coder, intercoder reliability was confirmed with three additional coders 
looking at a random sample of ten decisions from the case pool. There was 100 percent consistency across all 
four coders in terms of the ideological direction of the 10 cases and 83 percent consistency as to the value 
itself. 
The cumulative decision score per year will be the independent variable of focus, representing 
the annual nature of Supreme Court ourputs. Implementing Ordinary Least Squares regression, the 
analysis will focus on the relationship between this independent variable and the single dependent 
variable: change in public mood.124 Stimson's policy mood indicator is an amalgamated index that 
produces a single score to represent the aggregate shift along the liberal-conservative continuum of 
public mood over time by combining policy preferences of survey respondents across many different 
issues. Stimson's mood data is publicly available125 and was last updated in 2011. 
It is important to note that the data used in this research are not the raw mood scores. Instead, 
for the purposes of this analysis, the value produced by taking the change in mood from the previous 
year to the current year is used. Using a change score ensures that the direction of causality suggested 
is, indeed, the one being tested. In the form of a quasi-experimental design, we have the mood 
measure before the year of decisions, then the experimental treatment of Supreme Court decisions, 
and then the mood measure following those decisions. By subtracting the pre-experimental measure 
from the post-experimental measure, we can determine the effect of the experimental treatment. 
Looking at overall mood as a product of time-lagged decision scores would be a useful avenue 
for future research to pursue; however, the change score lends itself much better to the study at hand 
for a variety of reasons.'26 Though change scores are limited to shorr term analysis, they ensure the 
appropriate direction of causality, as mentioned above. Further, looking at change scores eliminates 
the chance that any relationship suggested by the data is only a long-term, possibly spurious, 
relationship. Isolating annual change in mood is therefore the best, though not the only, choice of 
dependent variables for this study. Thus, the focus of the analysis will ask the question: does the 
short-term change in tenor of Supreme Court decisions produce short-term change in mood? 
Finally, with the annual decision score as the key independent variable influencing the 
dependent change in mood, I also conrrol for fluctuations in the economy (inflation and 
unemployment),127 and the ideal point'28 and ideology of the Court.'2' Both sets of scores are given 
individually to each Justice. I took the average of these scores for each year to produce one ideal 
124 Stimson 2012 
125 These data are available at W\vw.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html. 
12<> Overall public mood is a cumulative, or developing, score, so to look at mood, rather than change in mood, 
the effects would probably not be seen 'without a large time lag. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of 
this research given the data collected. The case pool is 146 cases over 40 years, just under an average of four 
per year. Each annual time lag would eliminate one data point from a relatively small pool. Future research 
might additionally look at cases 10 to 20 years earlier so a time lag could be conducted with more confidence 
and thereby add another dimension to the research. 
127 It is well known that the state of the economy affects public mood (Erikson et. al. 2002); however, I 
anticipate that its influence, and thus its relevance, will be diminished when looking at change in mood rather 
than overall mood. Nevertheless, inflation and unemployment variables were included just to be certain. 
'28 Martin & Quinn 2002 
129 Segal & Cover 1989 
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point score and one ideology score for the entire Court in each year.130 The Martin-Quinn ideal 
point score offers a dynamic indicator of Court preference, with a new score given for every year an 
individual Justice serves. The Segal-Cover ideology score, which assigns a single value to each Justice 
for the duration of their time on the Court, offers a more stable and consistent indicator of Court 
preferences. Thus, we can control for multiple aspects of possible influence of Justices' influence on 
public mood that might bypass the Supreme Court decisions. 
The expectation for this research is that there is an identifiable influence of Supreme Court 
decisions on public mood, but I propose the nature of this relationship to be opposite that of the one 
found when at mood as a function of Congressional policy. Whereas there is a negative relationship 
between Congressional policy and mood, consistent with the thermostat analogy (as policy becomes 
warmer/more liberal there is an increased desire from the public for cooler/more conservative 
policy), I predict a positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and public mood. The 
Court is neither a representative nor elected institution, and therefore the public may not attempt to 
control the thermostat in the same way they do a Congressional body. Rather, it is plausible, and here 
expected, that the public listens to the Court as authoritative and final, recognizing their lack of 
control over the unelected body. In this way, I propose that Supreme Court decisions act as a 
recalibration of the thermostat, with the public meeting the Court closer to its espoused temperature, 
and d,en taking any qualms to Congress from this new playing field.13! 
Finally, I predict the level of agreement between Justices to make a difference. When looking 
only at unanimous decisions, I expect the above stated positive relationship \vill become stronger. A 
unanimous Court seems to put forth a certainty and finality that will be felt by the public. By the 
same token, greater dissent within the Court will signal a lack of cohesion, certainty, and therefore 
finality that will reduce the malleahility of public mood. Thus, I predict the relationship between 
130 The idea of using the average score of the three most ideologically moderate Justices in each y ear was 
considered but ultimately rejected. Though it is true that the more moderate Justices often act as the deciding 
votes in salient cases, and therefore the ideal points and ideologies of these Justices have a greater influence on 
the decision that ultimately reaches the public, this aspect is accounted for in the score given to each case. 
Instead, these variables are meant to control for the influence that the nature of the Court and its members, 
outside of its decisions, has on the public. While tIl s might be interesting, it is not the focus of the study and 
could potentially cloud the results. It seems plausible that when people look at the Court they respond more to 
a Scalia than a Kennedy; therefore, the average of the entire Court is what the public sees and what they would 
be influenced by (if at all) when considering decisions. In this way, these variables are supplemental and help to 
control for knowledge of the Court and its decisions-since I do not see either knowledge or awareness as a 
precondition for possible influence. 
131 How the public responds to Supreme Court decisions is different than how it responds to the Supreme 
Court. For the sake of theory, I propose that the public may indeed respond in accord with the thermostat 
analogy regarding the makeup of the Court, whlIe at the same time demonstrating a positive relationship 
regarding decisions put forth by the same Court. This is why it is important to ensure we are looking at the 
decision of the Court absent the influence of individual Justices. 
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Supreme Court decisions with three or four dissents will be weaker, if it even exists, than the 
influence of all cases.132 
FINDINGS 
The initial analysis looks at the influence of all the Supreme Court decisions in the case pool, 
divided into annual units with a single cumulative case score, on the change in public mood. Using 
annual decision scores, average ideology of the Court, average ideal point of the Court, 
unemployment rate, and inflation rate as the independent variables, OLS determines that we are 
explaining 24 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. In this regression, annual 
decision score is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and in the expected direction, with a positive 
B-value of .319. Average ideology of the Court and average ideal point of the Court were also 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. It is important to note that inflation rate came nowhere near 
approaching statistical significance as a predictor of change in mood,133 thus the model was repeated 
without inflation as an independent variable. 
In the new model, the independent variables still explain 24 percent of all variance; further, 
this explanatory power is now statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The key independent variable 
of annual Supreme Court decision score now has a strong positive relationship with change in mood, 
and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.134 For every one unit increase in the liberalism of the 
annual cumulative decision score, there is a .323 unit increase in the liberalism of overall public 
mood, holding all other variables fixed. These data are consistent with the hypothesis. 
Brand new, issue specific public mood data is currently being produced by Stimson and his 
team. Though the project is in its primitive stages, mood data for two issues, abortion and race,135 is 
now available dating back to the late 1960's and early 1970's.136 Issue specific data allows the addition 
of a deeper dimension to this research. It is a dimension ripe for exploration that will offer more 
reliable results than attempting to track public opinion data using individual questions or cases as has 
been done in the past. In order to use these data most effectively a race case decision score and an 
132 As a point of clarification, I stand by the fact that knowledge and awareness of the decision are not 
necessary preconditions for possible influence. The idea here is that the numerical divide representing the 
degree of the dissent need not be known in order to be felt through alternate channels. 
133 Lack of significance of both inflation and employment was anticipated due to the use of change scores as 
the dependent variable; however because inflation received a p value of . 913, its inclusion may be interfering 
with the results. 
134 Average ideology of the Court also moves to statistical significance at the . 05 level, while average ideal point 
of the Court remains statistically significant at the 0. 1 level. 
135 Average ideology and average ideal point were added to the equation with these issue specific tests in mind, 
otherwise it would seem the two variables were getting at largely the same thing. The more stable measure of 
ideology was added for the very stagnant issue of abortion, and the more dynamic measure of ideal point was 
added for the dynamic issue of race. Additionally, it was assumed that ideology would not be a good indicator 
for race given the changing ideological position on race during this time period. 
136 These data are produced in the same way as overall mood scores as discussed on page eleven, but for issue 
specific polling data only. The data are available at www.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html. 
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abortion case decision score was created for each annual term using the same method as was used for 
the initial analysis of all cases. Thus, we apply a test that looks at change in race mood as a function 
of cumulative race case decision scores and change in abortion mood as a function of cumulative 
abortion case decision scores. 
The setup for this model is nearly identical. However, when looking at race mood as a 
function of race case decision scores, the average ideal point of the Court is used as the key indicator 
to pick up the influence of preferences of the Justices themselves. Race is a dynamic issue that calls 
for use of a dynamic value; both the issue of race and public opinion towards racial issues have 
changed considerably over the course of the time period under study. Furthermore, because of the 
way the issue of race has evolved, ideology would not be an accurate way to get at preferences 
regarding the issue. By the same token, abortion is a static issue;137 neither the issue, nor public 
opinion towards it, has shown much variation over time. When looking at abortion mood as a 
function of abortion case decision scores, the average ideology of the Court is used as the key 
indicator to pick up the preference of the Justices themselves. 
The race model does not pass the significance test, with a p value of .1 03, meaning we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis and infer a relationship exits. However, all things considered, and given the 
relatively limited size of the data, a more elaborate, long-term study might not be dissuaded from 
hypothesizing similarly in expectation of a more fruitful yield.!38 
The abortion model, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and explains 
nearly 41 percent of the variance regarding change in abortion mood. The cumulative decision score 
for abortion cases is a statistically significant indicator for predicting change in abortion mood at the 
0.05 level. Interestingly, though not necessarily surprising, the relationship between abortion decision 
scores and abortion mood is strong and negative; for every one unit change towards more liberal 
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion there is a -1.27 unit change in liberalism of public mood 
on the issue. In other words, more liberal Supreme Court abortion decisions lead to a public desire 
for more conservative abortion policy. 
Because abortion is systematically an outlying issue,!39 and attitudes towards it simply tend not 
to change much at all, it is actually guite logical that regarding this particular issue there would be a 
negative relationship between Court decisions and public mood. People will not simply accept 
variation on this issue as authoritative and final. Furthermore, it is important to note that this 
137 This is a trend verified by ample polling data tracking the issue. 
138 Although we cannot infer a relationship exists vtith a p value of . 103, if we were to entertain the idea that a 
slightly larger case pool might reduce the p value the small amount necessary to infer a relationship exists, then 
it would be worthy to note that, looking past the F test to the T test, the race case decision score is statistically 
significant at the 0 .05 level. Furthermore, the relationship is strong and positive. 
139 e.g . Caldeira & Gibson 1992 
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negative relationship concerning a generally unique issue does not cause the breakdown of the overall 
model; rather, it allows us to theorize a better, more concrete model that looks at public mood as a 
function of all of the Supreme Court decisions in the original case pool minus abortion cases. 
Rerunning the OLS regression this way, we are able to explain 31 percent of the variance, statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision score minus abortion decisions 
variable is positive, strong, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For every one unit increase in 
liberalism in decision score there is a .512 unit increase in the liberalism of public mood. These data 
go a long way in providing additional evidence in support of the primary hypothesis of this study. 
Next, we look to more rigorously examine this story about Supreme Court influence on public 
mood and opinion by investigating the unanimity aspect of the decisions. There is a predicted 
interaction here, meaning Supreme Court decisions do different things to public mood depending on 
a third variable: degree of unanimity.l4D In this portion of the research, Supreme Court decisions are 
grouped according to their number of dissents: decisions with zero or one dissents are considered 
highly unanimous, while decisions with three or four dissents are considered to be highly divided. 
Running the model exactly the same way for only those decisions put forth with unanimity, we 
anticipate a stronger, positive relationship to emerge (see Figure 1). In fact, we find the unanimous 
decision model to explain about 44 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The decision score indicator for explaining change in mood is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
with a strong, positive B value of .93.141 This is consistent with the hypothesis and is logically 
pleasing-the more certain the Court is of their decision, demonstrated through unanimity, the more 
stock the public is willing to give the decision. 
Finally, in order to examine the alternate segment of the hypothesis we conduct one last 
regression using only highly divided decisions (three or four dissents) to detertnine the annual 
decision score, and use this as our key independent variable for predicting change in mood (see 
Figure 2). As expected, the findings indicate no statistical significance of any kind and do not even 
lend a hint of directionality of a potential relationship for future study. In other words, Supreme 
Court decisions completely lacking unanimity offer no explanatory power for determining the short­
term change in public mood. 
140 Here, degree of unanimity is taken solely as the number of dissenters. Though the limitation of this 
operationalization is noted-not all dissents, or dissenters, are created equally. 
141 Only 39 individual case scores qualified for this grouping of cases. This is a clear limitation, but also suggests 
that the data may actually underestimate the reality of this relationship. 
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Table 1 presents a summary of all fmdings. We can conclude that Supreme Court decisions 
influence public mood and that this relationship is positive. Furthermore, the positive relationship is 
strengthened by excluding abortion cases and when looking only at highly unanimous decisions (both 
over all cases, and cases regarding a single issue). Thus, there is an interaction concerning Supreme 
Court influence on public mood, depending on unanimity of the espoused decision. We cannot 
conclude a relationship exists between decisions lacking unanimity and public mood 
2JJ 
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Table 1: Change in Mood as a Function of Supreme Court Decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decision Score 2.028** 2.241** -2.642** 2.805** 2.592** 1.206 
(.323) (.514) (-1.270) (.512) (.930) (.257) 
.312 .400 -.648 .409 .539 .218 
Unemployment 1.216 .863 1.815* 1.193 .994 .511 
(.217) (.150) (.418) (.203) (.221) (.100) 
.187 .156 .467 .175 .204 .093 
Ideology -2.357** -1.619 -2.575** -2.143** -.152 
(-5.655) (-6.969) (-5.880) (-6.404) (-.456) 
-.368 -.393 -.382 -.466 -.027 
Ideal Point -1.785** -1.871 * -1.621 -1.921* -1.598 
(-.546) (.496) (-.470) (-.562) (-.502) 
-.282 .340 -.243 -.368 -.296 
R Square .241 ** .257 .406* .309** .443** .108 
Note: 
Each column indicates a separate regression: (1) all cases (2) race cases, (3) abortion cases, (4) abortion cases 
eliminated, (5 ) highly unanimous cases, (6) highly divided cases. 
* p < 0.1 ** P < 0.05 *** P < 0.01 
The t-value is listed first, followed by the B-value in parentheses, and then the Beta Weight. 
Average ideology and average ideal point are consistently negative, and frequcnrly significant. This can be taken 
to mean that the public can respond negatively to the Court itself but dissociate that from acceptance and 
internalization of the decisions. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This study does not attempt to upend the work suggesting public influence on the Supreme 
Court. Instead, the research in this study deepens the understanding of the relationship between the 
Court and the public in a way that begins to remedy the cognitive dilemma that Dahl wrote of so 
many years ago. The Supreme Court does function as a political player in the American form of 
government. The positive response hypothesis, oringinally put forth by Dahl (1957), but more 
recendy rejected by Johnson and Martin (1998) and others, carries weight in American politics 
beyond an attempt by the Court to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Certainly, this research does not 
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try to advance the notion of a purely positive response from the public to Court decisions, and even 
presents abortion as a counter example. The power of the Court to influence the public may be 
limited (or enhanced) by judicial capital, among a number of other factors; however, multiple forms 
of testing confirm that the Court can, and does, influence the public on salient issues (i.e. race, 
abortion) at least some of the time. Thus, taken together with evidence that the public likewise 
influences Supreme Court decisions, we are left with a picture of a paved and functioning two way 
street-a dialog between groups that were never intended to speak. 
At this point, it is worth reemphasizng the magnitude of the questions asked and answered in 
this study. The Supreme Court is a small unelected branch of the great American democracy, and yet 
the evidence holds from multiple angles that the American people are swayed and influenced by it in 
ways not mirrored by the elected branches. Again, in a study of salient issues and cases about which 
most people are said to have fixed opinions based on experience or proximity, we fmd a significant 
positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and subsequent public mood in the short­
term. The Supreme Court plays a role in changing (not merely forming) the minds and mood of at 
least some portion of the public. 
Judicial activism is a term thrown around by politicians and the public alike. Though no one 
defIninition necessarily encompasses the term better than another, it is generally thought to refer to 
the amount of deference the Court gives to Congressional policy. This study, completely uninterested 
in supporting or renouncing the accusations of judicial activism that seem wildly popular in current 
political culture, may function to refine the working defInition of judical activism as it stands. 
Perhaps activism should not be viewed in terms of deference granted to Congress by the Court, but 
rather in terms of deference granted to the Court by the public. Indeed, this would make the Court 
"active" in all senses of the word. Using judicial capital to create an artitude of deference from the 
American public results in what appears to be popular internalization and acceptance of Supreme 
Court decisions, for better or worse.142 
Certainly, the conclusions drawn must be viewed in light of the data used in the study: three 
salient issue domains and 40 years of Supreme Court decisions for a total of 146 salient decisions 
delievered to the American people. Future research might look to extend this study by both 
deepening and broadening the case pool. The time period limitation was discussed in an earlier 
portion of this paper, but to reiterate, a larger time period would allow for a more confident use of a 
time lag, which would add a long-term dimension to this short-term study. Furthermore, opening up 
142 Whether or not the S upreme Court puts forth apolitical, or anti-agenda decisions is beyond the scope of this 
paper although in this day of extreme polarization it is hard to imagine this might be so. 
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the case pool to include additional issue domains would go a long way in solidifying the evidence put 
forth in this analysis!43. 
Nevertheless, certain limitations will always surround the study of the Supreme Court and 
public opinion. Most notably, there is no systematic way to control for the social forces that effect 
both Supreme Court decisions and public mood. This problem is greatly minimized, if not eliminated 
completely, by the use of change in mood scores rather than raw mood scores, and the use of safety­
net economic indicators. However, any attempt to expand this study to a long-term analysis will have 
to grapple with the social forces that undeniably come with the terrain. 
Finally, further investigation into the notion and workings of judicial capital logically follows 
the study at hand. Theoretically, we can explain the evidence of the Court's influence on the public 
by way of judicial capital: the Court uses its capital to acqnire legitimacy of its decisions from the 
public, which subsequently turns into internal acceptance by the public. A scientific and 
psychological understanding of how the transfer from external acceptance (legitimacy) to internal 
acceptance (opinion) takes place would add a fluid and confident wholesomeness to the study of the 
Court-public relationship. As it stands, the evidence produced in this research already points to a 
well-developed, dynamic relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. It appears the 
"least dangerous branch" is something of a dark horse in the conversation that is the American 
Democracy. 
143 Public mood is a cumulative index that considers public opinion on many issues (e.g., gun control, 
healthcare. education); therefore, a model that included Supreme Court decisions from as many of those issues 
as possible would be best for this kind of study. 
60 I RE S PUB LIe A 
REFERENCES 
Baas, Larry R. and Dan Thomas. 1 984. "The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation: Experimental 
Tests." American PoliticsQllarter!J 1 2  (3): 335-360. 
Blake,]. 1977. "The Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions and Public Opinion in tbe United States. 
Popl/lation and Development Review 3 (1): 45-62. 
Caldeira, Gregory A. and James L. Gibson. 1992. "The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court." Americall jOllrtlal of Political Science, 36 (3): 635-664. 
Casillas, Christopher J., Peter K. Enns, and Patrick C. Wohlfartb. 2011 .  How Public Opinion 
Constrains tbe U.S. Supreme Court. American jotlrtlal of Political Scimce, 55 (1): 74-88. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1 957. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy­
Maker. Public La,v 6: 279-295. 
Deutsch, Karl W. 1 963. The Nerves of GovertlmCllt: Models of Political COlllIlJllllication and Contro!. London, 
UK: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Durr, Robert H., Andrew D. Martin, and Christina Wolbrecht. 2000. "Ideological Divergence and 
Public Support for tbe Supreme Court. AllIerican jOl/mal of Political SciCllce 44 (4): 768-776. 
Easton, David. 1953. The Political Systelll: An Inql/iry into the State of Political Science. New York, NY: 
Knopf. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jeffery A. Segal. 2000. "Measuring Issue Salience." AllIerican jOl/mal of Political SciCllce 
44 (1): 66-83. 
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro Polity. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Franklin, Charles H. and Liane C. Kosaki. 1989. "Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme 
Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion." American Political S cimce Revi"v 83 (3): 751-771. 
Hetherington, Marc J. and Joseph L. Smitb. 2007. "Issue Preferences and Evaluations of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Public Opinion Quarter!J 71 (1): 40-66. 
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y Shapiro. 2002. "Politics and Policy Making in the Real World: 
Crafted Talk and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness." In Navigating Pllblic Opinion: Polls, 
Policy, and the FI/tllre of AlllClicall Delllocracy, eds. Jeff Manza, Fay L. Cook, and Benjamin Page. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Jaros, Dean and Robert Roper. 1980. "The U.S. Supreme Court Mytb: Diffuse Support, Specific 
Support, and Legitimacy. American Politics Quarter!J 8 (1): 85-105. 
Johnson, Timotby R. and Andrew D. Martin. 1998. "The Public's Conditional Response to Supreme 
Court Decisions. AflJelican Political Science Review, 92 (2): 299-309. 
Marshall, Thomas R. 1 987. "The Supreme Court as an Opinion Leader: Court Decisions and the 
Mass Public." AIlJel;can PoliticsQl/arter!J, 15 (1): 147-168. 
RES PUB LIe A 1"61 
Martin, Andrew n and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999. PoliticalAnafysis 10,134-153. 
Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govem: PartY Control, u"wlaking and Investigations. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
McGuire, Kevin T. and James A. Stimson. 2004. "The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New 
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences." JOllmal of Politics 66 (4): 
1018-1035. 
Mishler, William and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1993. "The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian 
Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions." Alllerican Political 
Science Review 87 (1): 87-101. 
Mondak, Jeffery J. 1992. "Institutional Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court." 
AlllelicaJl Politics Qllalterfy 20 (4): 457-477. 
Murphy, Walter F. and Joseph Tannenhaus. 1968. "Public Opinion and Supreme Court: The 
Goldwater Campaign." Pllblic 0pinioJlQllarterfy, 32 (1): 31-50. 
Norpoth, Helmut, Jeffery A. Segal, William Mishler, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1994. "Popular 
Influence on Supreme Court Decisions." American Political Science Review 88 (3): 711-724. 
Petrick, Michael J. 1968. "The Supreme Court and Authority Acceptance." Political Researcb OI/a/1erfy, 
21 (1): 5-19. 
Segal, Jeffery A. and Alfred D. Cover. 1989. "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices." Alllerican Political Science Revielv 83(2): 667-565. 
Stimson, James A. 2012. "On the Meaning and Measurement of Mood." Daedallls 141 (4): 23-34. 
Srimson,James A., Michael B. Madmen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic representation." 
American Political Science Reviel» 89(3): 534-565. 
Stimson, James A. 2004. Tides of Consent: HOI» Pllblic Opinion Sbapes American Politics. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stimson, James A. 1991. Pllblic Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending. 
American JOll11lal of Political Science 39 (4): 981-1000. 
Zaller,John. 1992. The Natllre and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
